August 1914 and the Situation Today

In his book The Pity of War Niall Ferguson tells us that in August 1914 the British cabinet under the Liberal Prime Minister Lord Asquith was divided on the question whether to send troops to the continent, even after the German invasion of Belgium. Those who were against sending troops, he writes, took the view that the entente with France was not a legal commitment but merely an understanding of a sort.

Those who prevailed misread German intentions, Ferguson writes. They saw Kaiser Wilhelm (pictured here) as another Napoleon and did not understand that Germany’s main interests had always been focused on Eastern, rather than Western, Europe. He argues that the proponents of sending an English army to France – which was the trigger that made a wider war inevitable – were a minority, and that it was only because of the lack of conviction of the rest of the cabinet ministers and party leaders that the fateful decision was made. Ferguson argues that war with Germany was not even in England’s economic interests, since a German overseas presence would only have worked to France’s detriment, not Britain’s.

Ferguson asserts that Britain’s decision to enter into this war was historically speaking the greatest error of the twentieth century. Britain was wrong to cross the channel and fight the Germans in 1914. It cost far too much, in blood and money, for the advantage gained. By the end of the 20th century, after all, the Germans had achieved exactly what they wanted in 1914, economic leadership of Europe.

This argument comes to mind when one contemplates Germany’s predominant position in the European Union ten years after the beginning of the 21st century. We are reminded of this vividly every day as we follow the consequences of the Greek debt crisis.