General Stanley McChrystal and General Hans von Seeckt

On June 8, at a Couchiching Round Table (www.couch.ca) to discuss Making Hard Decisions in a Democracy: The Problem of Deficits, the political scientist Tim Lewis said en passant that in the United States there was a distinct possibility, in view of an increasingly dysfunctional political system, of a military-corporate “takeover.” That was not the occasion to sketch out in detail how this could be done and what it would mean but it is not hard to write a suitably depressing scenario.

It seems absurd to believe, at this moment, that an ambitious and gifted general like General McChrystal might in future stage such a coup. However, times change.

American presidents have always insisted, with good reason, that their authority be respected by the military, especially in wartime. One of them, a general himself, warned posterity of the power of the “military-industrial complex.” The history of our world is sprinkled with men on a white horse – and colonels in many colours – “taking over” at critical times.

In the United States, the military is held in high esteem. So it used to be in Prussia, later Germany, the homeland of modern militarism. (Nowadays American governments complain of Germany’s troublesome pacificm.) But in modern Germany, was there ever the possibility of a military putsch? Between its foundation in 1871 and the end of the monarchy in 1918 there was no need. In Bismarck’s Germany, and the Kaiser’s, the interests of the army invariably came first. The Iron Chancellor always appeared in the Reichstag in full uniform and the Kaiser was rarely, if ever, seen wearing a suit and tie, or a “smoking,” i.e., an evening jacket, or even tails.

There was a moment, in late January 1933, when it seemed certain that unless something happened, the senile president Hindenburg would be persuaded to appoint Adolf Hitler chancellor. That something was a military putsch by the Reichswehr, the army of a hundred thousand men permitted by the Treaty of Versailles, to pre-empt a Nazi takeover. To some extent, the Reichswehr still held on to the traditions of ancient Prussia – honesty, incorruptibility, a wholesome patriotism – virtues antithetical to Hitler’s fanaticism. If at the last minute a Reichswehr general like Kurt von Schleicher had taken over, suspending the constitution and establishing martial law, the worst might conceivably have been prevented. But von Schleicher was destined to play a different, fateful role, facilitating Hitler’s appointment on the assumption that he and other generals would be able to manipulate him. He had to pay for that illusion on June 30, 1934, when Hitler’s goons assassinated him and his wife.

During the fourteen years of the shaky, liberal Weimar republic, from 1919–1933, was there ever a possibility of a military coup? Even though large sections of the public did not support the republic, and even though during the first four years it had to cope with hundreds of assassinations committed by right-wingers, many by former officers, the answer is no, there was no such possibility.

The Reichswehr did not wish to be burdened with the responsibility of governing. It viewed itself as a state above the state and above the parties. There was a minister of national defence in the cabinet. The high command of the Reichswehr condescended to be polite to him but went its own way, including conducting secret negotiations with the Soviets behind Berlin’s back. There was no need for them to stage a putsch; they had everything they needed – including the resources to build up a secret army far in excess of the hundred thousand men permitted by Versailles.

The formidably haughty general – the “sphinx with the monocle” – who masterminded this role was Hans von Seeckt. Born in 1866, he was a monarchist and had a brilliant war record. He is credited with the breakthrough at Gordice on the Russian front in 1915. After that he was a general staff officer in various capacities, including chief of the general staff of the Turkish army. In these functions he was unusually successful as a strategic and operational planner, never as commander in chief, a job he avoided because it would have run against his nature.

When asked in 1919 what he thought should be the first steps to recover from defeat, he replied, reconstructing the armed forces to make Germany bündnisfähig again – a desirable ally – evading and eventually undoing the Treaty of Versailles – that was the highest priority, far more important than building up the economy or establishing solid civilian institutions. Reconstructing the armed forces meant, among other things, appointing three times as many officers from the old aristocracy than the Kaiser’s army had in 1914.

At the end of the war the army had contained four hundred thousand men. So three hundred thousand and twenty thousand officers had to be dismissed. Von Seeckt used the opportunity to purge the army of all elements he considered political, which included nationalists of all stripes. Freikorps men had to go, to become dangerous, murderous freelancers. So did former volunteers. So did men who longed for the happy days at the front. And, of course, Nazis and communists. They were all turfed out.

In 1926 the great strategist made a fatal strategic error. He invited Prince Wilhelm, one of the Kaiser’s grandsons, to attend army maneuvers in the uniform of the old imperial First Foot Guards, without first seeking government approval. Members of the Kaiser’s family were not allowed to participate in the public life of the republic, whatever the uniform they wore. An army maneuver was a public occasion. Von Seeckt had gone too far. The government fired him.

Nothing was further from General von Seeckt’s mind than to take his revenge by staging a coup d’état. Governing the country would have meant – God forbid! – dealing with civilians.

General McChrystal might not have the same aversion.

Source: The Weimar Triangle, a novel by Eric Koch to be published in the fall.