Ten points made by George Friedman in the Stratfor Geopolitical Weekly of August 24.
1. Many Muslim governments would be appalled if the United States broke with Israel and Israel fell. For example, Egypt and Jordan, facing demographic and security issues of their own, are deeply hostile to at least some Palestinian factions. Egypt struggles with the Muslim Brotherhood, which has collaborated with like-minded Islamists among the Palestinians for decades.
2. The countries of the Arabian Peninsula are infinitely more interested in the threat from Iran than in the existence of Israel and, indeed, see Israel as one of the buttresses against Iran. Even Iran is less interested in the destruction of Israel than it is in using the issue as a tool in building its own credibility and influence in the region.
3. Peace talks are the American solution. They give the United States the appearance of seeking to settle the Israeli-Palestinian problem. The comings and goings of American diplomats, treating Palestinians as equals in negotiations and as being equally important to the United States, and the occasional photo op if some agreement is actually reached, all give the United States and pro-American Muslim governments a tool – even if it is not a very effective one – for managing Muslim public opinion. Peace talks also give the United States the ability, on occasion, to criticize Israel publicly, without changing the basic framework of the U.S.-Israeli relationship. Most important, they cost the United States nothing. The United States has many diplomats available for multiple-track discussions and working groups for drawing up position papers. Talks do not solve the political problem in the region, but they do reshape perceptions a bit at very little cost.
4. The Israeli problem with the talks is that they force the government to deal with an extraordinarily divided Israeli public. Israel has had weak governments for a generation. An Israeli prime minister spends most of his time avoiding dealing with important issues, since his Cabinet would fall apart if he did.
5. From the point of view of any Israeli foreign minister, the danger of peace talks is that the United States might actually engineer a solution. Any such solution would by definition involve Israeli concessions that would be opposed by a substantial Israeli bloc – and nearly any Israeli faction could derail any agreement. Israeli prime ministers go to the peace talks terrified that the Palestinians might actually get their house in order and be reasonable – leaving it to Israel to stand against an American solution.
6. Fortunately for Netanyahu, the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) is even more troubled by talks. The Palestinians are deeply divided between two ideological enemies, Fatah and Hamas.
7. The PNA, dominated by Fatah, in no way speaks for all Palestinians. While Fatah dominates the West Bank, Hamas controls Gaza. Were Fatah to make the kinds of concessions that might make a peace agreement possible, Hamas would not only oppose them but would have the means of scuttling anything that involved Gaza. Making matters worse for Fatah, Hamas does enjoy considerable – if precisely unknown – levels of support in the West Bank, and Mahmoud Abbas, the leader of Fatah and the PNA, is not eager to find out how much in the current super-heated atmosphere.
8. Neither side has a government that can speak authoritatively for the people it represents. On both sides, the rejectionists not only are in a blocking position but are actually in governing roles, and no coalition exists to sweep them aside. The Palestinians are divided by ideology and geography, while the Israelis are “merely” divided by ideology and a political system designed for paralysis.
9. The United States wants a peace process, preferably a long one designed to put off the day when it fails. This will allow the United States to appear to be deeply committed to peace and to publicly pressure the Israelis, which will be of some minor use in U.S. efforts to manipulate the rest of the region. But it will not solve anything. Nor is it intended to.
10. The problem is that neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians are sufficiently unsettled to make peace. Both Egypt and Israel were shocked and afraid after the 1973 war. Mutual fear is the foundation of peace among enemies. The uncertainty of the future sobers both sides. But the fact right now is that all of the players prefer the status quo to the risks of the future. Hamas doesn’t want to risk its support by negotiating and implicitly recognizing Israel. The PNA doesn’t want to risk a Hamas uprising in the West Bank by making significant concessions. The Israelis don’t want to gamble with unreliable negotiating partners on a settlement that wouldn’t enjoy broad public support in a domestic political environment where even simple programs can get snarled in a morass of ideology. Until reality or some as-yet-uncommitted force shifts the game, it is easier for them – all of them – to do nothing.
But the Americans want talks, and so the talks will begin….
Eric Koch’s new book, The Weimar Triangle, is available at Indigo-Chapters and in your local bookstore. 
Despite the apparent futility of it all and the overwhelming complexity of the Middle East mix, not to talk is the wrong choice. Churchill is still right: to jaw-jaw is always better than to war-war. Even tiny incremental gains and minor agreements leading to a little less tension, a little more cooperation, and a bit more safety for the peoples of the region would be a good and perhaps even achievable outcome.
Yes, talking is better than the alternatives.
Espcieally since we must not forget that beneath the surface of the byzantine political theatre there are many unpublicized and often highly productive cooperative contacts involving Israelis and non-Israelis.
This is a little like Italy that, despite its chaotic official politics, works tolerably well because the local subterranean machinery has functioned more or less smoothly since pre-Roman times.
For peace of mind perhaps it is better not to think about the forthcoming Middle East peace talks.
Why not? If you only want to think of pleasant things, such as that during the next five days the sun will shine in Toronto, it is wise to assume that this will be only a limited engagement.
I think the writer is too pessimistic. There are a number of productive contacts between Israel and the Palestinians. I consider it improbable but POSSIBLE that a two-state solution can be achieved. Israel is afraid of American abandonment, thus pressure from the US may have unexpected consequences. I am afraid of the pressure from the Likud and Shas side of the Israeli political spectrum. And Hamas. If it were easy it would have happened years ago.
Please note my response to David Schatzky.