John Simpson, BBC, reported yesterday:
Until Saturday, Burmese democracy campaigner Aung San Suu Kyi was arguably the world’s most famous prisoner.
Now she is free. And in the sweltering heat in the headquarters of her party, the National League for Democracy – which according to the military government in Burma no longer exists – she gave the BBC her first face-to-face television interview for seven years.
The main question, now that she is free, remains the future of Burma’s military government. Ms. Suu Kyi did not shy away from it.
Did Burma face a velvet revolution – peaceful and non-violent, as in the former Czechoslovakia in 1989 – or something fiercer?
“It would be nice if it could happen,” she answered. “We would like a non-violent, peaceful revolution.”
Perhaps reflecting that the military government might well react to all this with anger, she went on: “By revolution I mean a great change for the better.”
Might saying this get her into trouble with the authorities, I asked.
“I don’t quite know how they will interpret the word ‘revolution,’” she replied. “For me, ‘revolution’ simply means radical change.”
But radical change of any kind is precisely what the military government wants to stop. Might her words get her sent back to a further period of house arrest?
The danger does not frighten her.
“It’s always possible,” she said. “My attitude is, do as much as I can while I’m free. And if I’m arrested I’ll still do as much as I can.”
Opposite her party’s headquarters, several dozen plain-clothes security men had established themselves, some of them taking photographs of everyone going in and out.
The government’s surveillance of Ms. Suu Kyi and her party colleagues is remarkably intensive.
They are often followed on foot, and on the motor-scooters, which only the security police are allowed to drive in Rangoon.
She would, she said, act cautiously.
She knew they could well be bugging her rooms and eavesdropping on her conversations, so she would not be foolhardy. But she would continue to give interviews to international organizations like the BBC.
Might she one day be the country’s leader, I asked.
She was certain that Burma would achieve democracy one day, but that did not mean she would be president.
In the long years she has been under house arrest, the world has changed. The internet and the mobile phone have revolutionized the lives of billions around the world – including in Burma.
Ms. Suu Kyi was allowed to use neither gadget while she was a prisoner.
When she made her first appearance on Saturday and saw the thousands of mobiles held up towards her by her supporters who wanted to take her photograph, she was taken aback.
She was surprised when she first handled the mobile, which someone gave her to phone her son Kim in Bangkok.
She had seen them in photographs, but this one seemed so small and inadequate, and she found it hard to know how to listen to it and talk into it.
But, she said, smiling, it worked perfectly well.
Eric Koch’s book, The Weimar Triangle, is available at Indigo-Chapters and in your local bookstore. 
Aung San Suu Kyi, like Nelson Mandela, has an amazing capacity for inner strength and what seems to be reconciliation. While we can hope she has the skills and capacity to lead, she has immense internal strength and courage.
I like her better than Sarah Palin
The election of ASSK (her bureaucratic acronym) and her party, the NLD was twenty years ago, shortly after the fall of the Soviet Empire and Tienamin Square. Few will remember that the public and official reaction changed our approach to international human rights.
While Canada had for some time spoken out officially for the due process and or release of human rights advocates in cases where there were no direct tangible Canadian interests in the country, the group, or individual (as well as when there was a direct interest), Myanmar/Burma and the NLD election (that was stolen) set a precedent. The official condemnation contained no “fig leaf” link to Canadian interests in the country or process, and directly challenged the “internal affairs” of a sovereign state, on the grounds of Canadian and international community interest in the rights and wellbeing of the Burmese people. Where a Canadian company had an interest, PetroCanada, the Foreign Minister chose to publicly as well as privately question their judgement, suggesting that it would be best if they were not in the country. (A few years later, they sold their interest and left).
I challenge this learned readership to find a prior example of such a public position sans “fig leaf”, and that clearly challenged the “internal affairs” of a “sovereign state”.
NGOs and (most) Western nations were united in calls for some degree of a boycott (expanded over the decades), befitting a ruling group whose name sounds like it leaped out of an episode of “Get Smart”; I kid you not they were the SLORC – The State Law and Order Restoration Council. US and Canadian condemnations actually got out ahead of local NGOs, at key points of the crisis.
But was the international community’s policy on sanctions the right one? Was it evidenced-based? We were certainly in very good human rights company! Note the repeat of the criticism in the Asia Pacific Foundation article below that by further isolating Myanmar we forced it closer to its only powerful patron. Most Canadian’s remain proud of Canada’s long term independent stand on engagement with Cuba, while we continued to condemn their human rights violations. Why did we believed it the right approach for Cuba but not Burma/Myanmar?
Final Observation: When Mandela was released the ANC was relatively united and was picking up white support from the South African left. There were no tribal rivalries that were likely to result in a civil war (the threat posed by the old regime) South Africa’s majority Black and “Coloured” population, key groups of ruling Whites, as well as much of the international community, were primed to support the ANC as the uniting force of majority rule (under power sharing and the rule of law). For many reasons, recent and historical, the NLD does not play that role in Burma/Myanmar today, and may never be able to do so.
The article/editorial below was published by the Asia Pacific Foundation
and may interest the learned readership.
Cheers
Mike Sky
At the Cusp of Change? Myanmar Making Limited but Progressive Steps Forward 1
By Bruce Matthews, 18 November 2010
World attention has been focused on Myanmar. The shadowy Southeast Asian country has recently seen two momentous events: the 7 November elections and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s release after a seven-year house arrest. Though the election results were a foregone conclusion, there is arguably still a small opening for civilian participation in a national assembly. With the release of Daw Suu Kyi, revered by many as the champion of human and civil rights, and as the true but disenfranchised leader of the country since 1990, her vision for the future of the nation presents fresh opportunities for political contestation. Of course, it would be easy to exaggerate the importance that the country’s first elections in twenty years and Suu Kyi’s release mark. Optimism about the possibilities of ‘change’ should be tempered by taking into consideration the historical record of the country since the military take-over of Burma in 1962. And yet Myanmar has moved closer to addressing its problems in a more open manner. It should come as no surprise that the elections had many irregularities. The Union Solidarity and Development Party, a proxy for the military, already claims victory in 80% of the polls. There is no news yet about who will be the President or the Commander-in-Chief, two key positions in the loosely attached executive, the eleven-person National Security and Defense Council. With the refusal of Daw Suu Kyi or her National League for Democracy to participate, a modicum of democratic process was found only among the handful of seats contested by three small parties. Some claim that the elections provided a way for Senior General Than Shwe to keep disgruntled officers off-guard. Some have even suggested that the elections are part of a plan to slowly ease the junta out of its half-century control of the polity. The elections further allow the government to promote a PRC-model of centralized political control presiding over a ‘liberalized’ economy. Liberalization of the economy has involved a substantial sell-off of state resources to crony civilian partners of the junta. Upon her release on November 13, Daw Suu Kyi made an initial appearance at her residence gate and the next day went to her former National League for Democracy headquarters to meet a crowd of thousands (although the party was officially dissolved in May 2010). Her hour-long speech was marked by exhortations to maintain unity, hold on to what is right, to not give up hope, and to “be ready to stand up for what you believe in.” Photographs and videos reveal that she retains a powerful charisma. Given her rough experiences with the junta in 2000 and 2003, when she actively sought a political role, she may now be extremely cautious bringing together the forces of democracy. As an unelected figure, her role may be more Gandhian than overtly political or confrontational. Some aver that because Daw Suu Kyi has been out of contact with every-day folk and the big economic changes that have taken place in Myanmar during her house arrest – which she fully acknowledges – she will have to be less unyielding. She will also face a new generation of hard-line generals, many who would not favour her touring the country to promote alternative forms of government. Given the relatively successful manner in which the junta managed to bring forward a new constitution and parliamentary elections, Indian writer Sagari Chhabra even asks: “has Suu Kyi been rendered unnecessary in the new scheme of things?” (Hindustan Times 12 November, 2010). Nonetheless, the ‘new’ government of Myanmar will have to adjust to Daw
2
Suu Kyi’s influential public persona. She has indicated that she bears no grudge against the government for years of confinement. Daw Suu Kyi will be expected to respond to several major challenges including, first and foremost, her relationship with both Parliament and the National Security and Development Council. Moreover, she will face issues related to the release of political prisoners, the challenges of outreach to deeply mistrustful ethnic minority communities, and clarifying her role among the democracy groups that have emerged during her latest seven-year house arrest. Daw Suu Kyi’s role in helping to ease economic sanctions by marshaling her persuasive international reputation is an issue that will have important internal and international ramifications. Western countries have primarily relied on sanctions to register their discontent with political tyranny in Myanmar, though critics claim the strategy has even further isolated the regime and left it open to China’s hegemonic advantage. Daw Suu Kyi alone has the international credentials to persuade sanction-imposing countries to eliminate these penalties, making her a valuable asset to the government. She may already have made offers to the junta to help lift the restrictions, which she now sees are deeply unpopular with the majority of ordinary citizens. She has intimated that if the demise of sanctions is the public will, she will take that into consideration. Although the decision to lift international sanctions will likely depend on more than just the release of Daw Suu Kyi, arguably such actions by countries like Canada, the US and UK would hugely assist the millions of Burmese whose livelihoods have been at best, compromised and at worst, ruined by blanket sanction application. Canadians and others who live in democratic countries will want to watch developments in Myanmar carefully, and continue to seek ways to reach out to those who work for freedom in a country so long deprived of responsible government and meaningful progress.
Bruce Matthews is Professor Emeritus of Comparative Religion from Acadia University. This op-ed is a follow-up his Canada-Asia Agenda, Issue 13, entitled ‘A Nation at Cross-Roads: Myanmar’s 2010 National Election